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Abstract
The monetary authority loses the ability to implement the Taylor Rule at the
zero lower bound. However, the promise to implement a Taylor Rule upon exit
remains an e¤ective policy instrument. We present two Taylor-Rule exit policies,
each with di¤erent commitment requirements, as alternatives to a truncated Taylor
Rule. A Taylor Rule with an optimally-chosen exit date and time varying ination
target delivers fully optimal policy, but requires a negative ination target, possibly
threatening the ability to commit. A Taylor Rule with only an optimally-chosen
exit date delivers almost all the gains of fully optimal policy with no need to commit
to the negative ination target.
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1 Introduction
Once the nominal interest rate reaches the zero lower bound (ZLB), monetary policy
looses the ability to stimulate the economy by further reducing the nominal interest rate.
Yet, the monetary authority retains the ability to stimulate by promising a path for
future interest rates which can raise expected ination, thereby reducing the current real
interest rate. Conventional monetary policy, dened as setting current and future short-
term interest rates, retains a role at the ZLB when the monetary authority is willing to
announce "forward guidance" for short-term rates.
In the standard New Keynesian model, monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor
Rule, whereby the nominal interest rate is set to equal a target, comprised of the sum of
targets for the real interest rate and ination, and to respond strongly to deviations of
ination and output from their respective targets. Woodford (2003, p. 287) argues that
when all shocks are to demand, a Taylor Rule with a time-varying interest rate target
equal to the natural rate, implements optimal monetary policy. Setting the nominal
interest rate equal to the natural rate assures that both the output gap and ination are
zero. The strong response of the interest rate to deviations of ination and output from
their targets eliminates sunspot equilibria, thereby assuring that the equilibrium is locally
unique.
The monetary authority cannot set the nominal interest rate equal to the natural rate,
as required by Woodfords implementation of optimal monetary policy with the Taylor
Rule, when the natural rate is negative. We show that there is Taylor-Rule policy for
exiting the ZLB which can implement optimal monetary policy at the ZLB. The monetary
authority must make two changes to Woodfords Taylor Rule. First, it must announce the
rst date on which the Taylor Rule applies, an exit date, setting the nominal interest rate
to zero until that date. Second, the monetary authority modies the Taylor Rule with
an ination target which declines at a xed rate after the exit date.1 This Taylor-Rule
exit policy di¤ers from a "truncated" version of Woodfords Taylor Rule on two counts.
First, exit is postponed beyond the date on which the natural rate rst becomes positive;
second exit occurs at a non-zero ination target.
We show that when the policy parameters are chosen optimally, commitment to the
optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy implements optimal monetary policy at the ZLB. The
1There is empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that actual monetary policy has operated
with a time-varying ination target in the Taylor Rule. Ireland (2007) argues that US ination can be
explained by a New Keynesian model with a Taylor Rule only if the ination target is allowed to vary
over time. Additionally, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), Rudebusch and Wu (2004) and Gurkaynak, Sack
and Swanson (2005) provide evidence of a time-varying short-run ination target for the US.
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postponed exit date provides stimulus since the interest rate will be kept at zero even
after the natural rate becomes positive. The optimal ination target is negative, allowing
the monetary authority to smooth the squared deviations of the output gap and ination,
responsible for welfare, reducing the large early deviations at the expense of creating
small negative deviations later. The welfare gains over a truncated Taylor Rule can be
large. Using our benchmark parameter values, over a range of adverse shocks for which
the initial natural interest rate varies between -0.58% to -4.97% at an annual rate, loss
with the truncated Taylor Rule ranges from 2.5 to 7 times the loss under optimal policy.
However, the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy requires commitment to future deation
and recession, a requirement which could prove di¢ cult politically.
We also consider an alternative Taylor-Rule exit policy which requires limited com-
mitment. The monetary authority commits only to a particular exit time in the future,
with this exit date chosen optimally, subject to a zero ination target. We nd that
this "T-only" policy achieves almost all of the welfare gains of moving from a truncated
Taylor Rule to the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy. These results justify the US Federal
Reserve policy of announcing that the nominal interest rate would be xed near zero for
a "considerable period" of time, without any additional announcement of future recession
or deation.
Our paper is related to other papers which address monetary policy at the ZLB. Adam
and Billi (2006, 2007) and Nakov (2008) have analyzed optimal policy under discretion
and under commitment when autoregressive demand shocks yield the possibility of the
ZLB. They do not explicitly consider implementation or the Taylor Rule. Cochrane (2013)
shows that the discretionary commitment to exit the ZLB with zero values for ination
and the output gap yields a unique equilibrium at the ZLB. But, he also argues that if the
policy maker could commit to exit the ZLB at di¤erent values for ination and the output
gap, this could yield a preferable equilibrium during the ZLB. Krugman (1998), Eggertson
andWoodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006), and Nakov (2008) demonstrate that optimal
monetary policy with commitment relies on an increase in inationary expectations to
leave the ZLB. Levin, Lopez-Salido, Nelson, and Yun (2009) argue that, when the shock
sending the economy to the ZLB is large and persistent, the stimulus which conventional
monetary policy can provide at the ZLB is not su¢ cient to prevent a sizeable recession.
These policies work within the connes of a simple New Keynesian model, in which
the e¤ects of monetary policy are transmitted through the real interest rate. Much of
the literature on monetary policy in a liquidity trap expands policy to unconventional
methods, which are e¤ective to the extent that nancial-market arbitrage is imperfect,
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that the monetary authority assumes risk on its balance sheet, and/or the quantity of
money has an e¤ect on the economy independent of its e¤ect on the real interest rate.
These policies are interesting and potentially useful, but the simple New Keynesian model
is not complex enough to provide a role for them.2 In a similar context, Williamson (2010)
argues that there is no ZLB, in the sense that the monetary authority can always nd
some stimulative instrument. This instrument can be unconventional monetary policy,
but we argue that it can also be a commitment to a Taylor-Rule exit policy.
Additionally, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), Woodford (2011), Werning
(2012), Erceg and Linde (2014), among others have considered the implications of using
scal policy when monetary policy loses its e¤ectiveness.3 Understanding the e¤ectiveness
of scal policy at the ZLB, together with its interactions with conventional and unconven-
tional monetary policy is interesting and important, but is not the subject of this paper.
Our focus is more narrow what can the monetary authority do in the absence of scal
cooperation in the stimulus e¤ort?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simple New Keynesian model
with a Taylor Rule for monetary policy. Section 3 provides the solution with commitment
to the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy. Section 4 provides the solution with commitment
to optimal monetary policy, and Section 5 shows that, with parameter values optimally
chosen, the Taylor-Rule exit policy implements optimal monetary policy. Section 6 solves
numerically for optimal values of the exit time and ination target upon exit for the
optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy. Section 7 solves the model under the "T-only" policy,
and Section 8 concludes.
2 Simple New Keynesian Model with Taylor Rule
Following Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2010), we represent the simple standard lin-
earized New Keynesian model as an IS curve, derived from the Euler Equation of the
representative agent, and a Phillips Curve, derived from a model of Calvo pricing (Calvo,
1983). The linearization is about an equilibrium with a long-run ination rate of zero.4
yt = Et (yt+1)   [it   rnt   Ett+1] (1)
2Examples of unconventional monetary policy include Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004), Blinder (2000,
2010), Bernanke (2002), Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), Clouse
et.al. (2003) and Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2004,2005).
3Some unconventional monetary policies are arguable scal policies.
4This does not require that the ination rate be zero in the long run, only that it not be so far from
zero to make the linearization inappropriate (Woodford 2003, p. 79).
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t = Et (t+1) + yt: (2)
In these equations yt denotes the output gap; ination (t) is the deviation about a
long-run value of zero; it denotes the nominal interest rate, with a long-run equilibrium
value of r = 1 

; where r is dened as the long-run real interest rate and rnt as the natural
rate of interest;  represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with   1; 
represents the degree of price stickiness;5  2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor. The
natural rate of interest embodies the combination of the long-run natural rate together
with shocks associated with preferences, technology, scal policy, etc. Following Woodford
(2003, Chapter 4), we do not add an independent shock to ination in the Phillips Curve.6
This restricts the analysis to the case where monetary policy faces no trade-o¤ between
ination and the output gap.
We assume that, if the economy has not recently experienced the zero lower bound,
the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor Rule, given
by
it = r
n
t + 

t+1 +  (t   t ) + y (yt   yt ) ; (3)
where t represents a potentially time-varying ination target and y

t is the output target,
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given by
yt =
t   t+1

: (4)
This Taylor Rule has two distinguishing characteristics. First, it allows a potentially time-
varying ination target. In periods for which the zero lower bound is distant history, the
optimal value for the ination target is zero, and we assume that the monetary authority
chooses an ination target of zero in these circumstances. Second, Woodford (2003) has
shown that optimal policy requires allowing the nominal rate to vary with the natural
rate, yielding a time-varying intercept. Since we allow a potentially time-varying ination
target, our intercept varies not only with the natural rate, but also with the ination
target.
5 = (1 s)(1 s)s
 1+!
1+!" , where s 2 (0; 1) represents the fraction of randomly selected rms that cannot
adjust their price optimally in a given period. Therefore, s = 0 )  ! 1 ) complete exibility and
s = 1)  = 0) complete stickiness. Hence,  2 (0;1)) incomplete exibility. ! > 0 is the elasticity
of rms real marginal cost with respect to its own output, " > 0 is the price elasticity of demand of the
goods produced by monopolistic rms. See, Adam and Billi (2006) and Woodford (2003) for details.
6Adam and Billi (2006) demonstrate that calibrated supply shocks are not large enough to send the
economy to the zero lower bound.
7This specication for target output follows Woodford (2003), p. 246. He sets target output equal to
the solution of equation (2) with ination set at target ination. Ours di¤ers because the target ination
can vary over time.
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The equilibrium solution for the output gap and ination is independent of the values
for ' and 'y as long as they are large enough to assure two unstable roots.
8 Therefore,
it is important to understand the role of these policy parameters. The promise to respond
strongly to any sunspot shocks that raise ination and/or output, in Cochranes (2011)
words, "to blow up the economy" in the event of sunspot shocks, serves to rule out
sunspot equilibria and to assure a locally unique equilibrium. This requires that the
monetary authority be completely transparent, communicating the intention to "blow up
the economy" and that this threat be completely credible. This is because ' and 'y
do not show up in the equilibrium solution and therefore cannot be inferred from any
observable evidence.9
The monetary authority can follow the Taylor Rule, described by equation (3), as
long as it yields a positive nominal interest rate. Once the natural rate of interest falls
below zero, the Taylor Rule becomes infeasible. Nakov (2008) considered a "truncated"
Taylor Rule, in which the monetary authority follows a Taylor Rule10 whenever it implies
a positive nominal interest rate and otherwise sets the nominal rate to zero. The "trun-
cated Taylor Rule" implies a promise to exit the ZLB as soon as the natural rate becomes
positive and to exit at zero values for ination and the output gap. Cochrane (2013)
argues that commitment to exit the ZLB at positive values for ination and the output
gap would yield a preferable equilibrium during the ZLB. Krugman (1998), Eggertson and
Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), and Nakov (2008) demonstrate that opti-
mal monetary policy with commitment relies on an increase in inationary expectations
to leave the ZLB.
In this paper we assume that the monetary authority can commit to a Taylor-Rule
exit policy while at the ZLB, allowing conventional monetary policy to retain stimulative
e¤ects. Framing the policy in terms of the familiar Taylor Rule facilitates communication
and implementation. We consider two alternative designs for the exit policy, and nd
that with full commitment and optimally chosen policy parameters, the Taylor-Rule exit
policy implements optimal monetary policy. However, commitment only to an exit date,
and not to a non-zero ination target, achieves most of the gains of fully optimal policy
relative to the truncated Taylor Rule.
8The criteria for two unstable roots is:  ('   1) + (1  )'y > 0:
9Cochrane (2011) emphasizes that at the optimal equilibrium, values for ' and 'y do not a¤ect the
equilibrium. Woodford (2003, p. 288) makes the same point. If there were shocks to the Phillips Curve,
or if the intercept to the Taylor Rule did not vary optimally, then we would have evidence on the values
of ' and 'y. However, we would not have evidence that the monetary authority would actually "blow
up" the economy in the event of a sunspot shock.
10Nakovs (2008) Taylor Rule does not have a time-varying intercept.
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3 Solution with Full Commitment to a Taylor-Rule
Exit Policy
We follow Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005) by assuming that the shock which
creates the ZLB is autoregressive and vanishes at a xed rate. Specically, we assume
that in period t = 1 a large adverse shock to the natural rate sends the nominal interest
rate in the Taylor Rule to zero. The shock () deteriorates at rate  such that
rnt = r
n +  1t 1 () :
where, rn = r = 1 

. In order to obtain analytical results, we continue to follow Jung et
al (2005) and assume that there are no other shocks, restricting our solution to certainty.11
Additionally, we follow their technique of separating the solution into two periods, one
after exiting the ZLB and one before.
The Taylor-Rule exit policy requires that the monetary authority announce an exit
policy whereby it promises to implement equation (3) with ination target
T+1+i = 
i

 i  0;
on its chosen exit date (T + 1) : The choice of the time-varying ination target requires
that the monetary authority choose two parameters, the ination target on the exit date
() ; and the rate at which it declines (). Prior to the announced exit date, the nominal
interest rate remains zero. The monetary authority must be able to fully commit.
3.1 Solution on Exit Date from ZLB Forward
Substituting the interest rate from the Taylor Rule (3), and target output, from equa-
tion (4) using t+1 from equation (2), into the demand equation (1) yields a two-equation
system given by
yt+1 =

1 + 

y +



yt + 

  
1


t   t+1; (5)
t+1 =  

yt +
1

t; (6)
11Explicit extension of the results to uncertainty is the subject of future research.
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where
t+1 = z

t z =     +
y

(1  ) :
When y and  are chosen large enough to satisfy the Taylor Principle, as we assume
here, both roots, denoted by 1 and 2; are larger than one. We solve forward, with both
the output gap and ination determined to eliminate the two unstable roots, yielding
values for initial conditions upon exit as
yT+1 =
(1  )z
 (1   ) (2   )
; (7)
T+1 =
z
 (1   ) (2   )
: (8)
Note that yT+1 and T+1 are related by
yT+1 =
(1  )

T+1: (9)
Values for the output gap and ination beyond the exit date are governed by the
monetary authoritys choices for  the rate at which the target vanishes, : We can
write the solution either in terms of  and , or, using equation (8), in terms of T+1
and : For t  T + 1; the appendix shows that values are given by
yt =
(1  )
 (1   ) (2   )
zt (T+1) 
 =
(1  )

t (T+1) T+1; (10)
t =

 (1   ) (2   )
zt (T+1) 
 = t (T+1) T+1: (11)
The nominal interest rate is set to achieve these values for the output gap and ination.
From equation (1), the nominal interest rate on the date of exit from the ZLB and beyond
(t  T + 1) is
it = r
n
t + t+1 +
1

(yt+1   yt) ; t  T + 1:
3.2 Solution Prior to Exit ZLB
Equations (1) and (2), with the nominal interest rate set to zero, yield solutions for
the output gap and ination prior to exit. One root is less than one and one is greater.
We denote the stable root by !1 and the unstable one by !2: The solutions are subject
to the terminal conditions given by equations (7) and (8).
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Equations (38) and (39) in the appendix contain solutions as
yt =
1
(!2 !1)

1
!1
T+1 t
(!2   ) (1  !1) +

1
!2
T+1 t
(   !1) (1  !2)

T+1
+ 
(!2 !1)
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t
(1  !1) 

1
!2
k+1 t
(1  !2)

rnk ;
(12)
t =
1
(!2 !1)

1
!1
T+1 t
(!2   ) +

1
!2
T+1 t
(   !1)

T+1
+ 
(!2 !1)
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t
 

1
!2
k+1 t
rnk :
(13)
These equations illustrate how the Taylor-Rule exit policy a¤ects the behavior of the
output gap and ination during the period of the ZLB. If we were truncating the Taylor
Rule, then the only terms determining the output gap and ination at the ZLB would be
those with the natural rate of interest, while the natural rate is negative. For standard
parameter values, the terms multiplying the natural rates are positive. Therefore, the
negative natural rate terms yield negative e¤ects.
The Taylor-Rule exit policy adds terms with positive natural rates up until the last
period prior to the chosen exit date, providing a stimulative e¤ect. The stimulus is
greater the more natural rate terms are added, that is, the further into the future exit
is postponed. The Taylor-Rule exit policy also adds a term with the value of ination
upon exit (T+1). The term multiplying T+1 is positive and increasing in T . Therefore,
the value of ination upon exit also provides stimulus. From equation (8), the monetary
authority chooses values for the ination target () and the rate at which the ination
target vanishes () ; thereby choosing the value of ination upon exit (T+1) :
To gain insight on how optimal values for the policy parameters are determined under
an optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy, we turn to the solution for fully optimal policy.
4 Solution under Optimal Policy
Under fully optimal policy the standard presentation has the monetary authority di-
rectly choose values for the output gap, ination, and the nominal interest rate, subject
to equations (1) and (2) and to the restriction that the nominal interest rate be positive,
to maximize utility of the representative agent. We use Woodfords (2003) linear approx-
imation to the utility function of the representative agent when equilibrium ination is
8
zero and the exible-price value for output is e¢ cient. The Lagrangian is given by
L =
1X
t=1
t 1

 1
2
 
2t + y
2
t
  1;t [ (it   rnt   t+1)  yt+1 + yt]  2;t [t   yt   t+1] + 3;tit ;
where the third restriction represents the inequality constraint on the nominal interest
rate. First order conditions with respect to t; yt; and it respectively are
2;t   2;t 1 + t    11;t 1 = 0; (14)
1;t    11;t 1 + yt   2;t = 0; (15)
 1;t + 3;t = 0 3;tit  0 3;t  0 it  0: (16)
Equations (16) reveal that when the nominal interest rate is zero, in the period of the
ZLB, that 3;t is weakly positive, implying that 1;t is weakly positive. In the period
after exit from the ZLB, the nominal interest rate becomes positive, moving 3;t to zero,
implying that 1;t is zero.
4.1 Solution for Output Gap and Ination after Exit from ZLB
(t  T + 2)
Exit from the ZLB occurs in period T + 1. After exit, 1;t = 0 and it  0: We begin
the solution with period T +2 instead of period T +1; since 1;T+1 = 0; but its lag
 
1;T

could be positive. The equations of the model become
yt+1 = yt +  (it   rnt   t+1) ; (17)
t+1 =  

yt +
1

t; (18)
2;t   2;t 1 + t = 0; (19)
yt   2;t = 0: (20)
First di¤erence equation (20) to yield
yt+1   yt = 

 
2;t+1   2;t

:
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Substitute from equation (19) to yield
yt+1   yt =  

t+1 =





yt   1

t

: (21)
Equations (18) and (21) can be solved to yield values for output and ination in periods
T + 2 and beyond with initial values in period T + 1:
One root exceeds unity and the other is less than unity. Letting  2 be the smaller
stable root, initial values for output and ination must lie along the saddlepath, thereby
eliminating the unstable root, and requiring
yT+1 =
(1   2)

T+1 =
 2
 (1   2)
T+1; (22)
where the second equality uses the characteristic equation for the system.12 Solutions
depend on the initial conditions, determined to assure stability after exit, and the stable
root. Equations (42) and (43) in the appendix yield solutions for t  T + 1 as
yt =

1   2


 
t (T+1)
2 T+1; (23)
t =  
t (T+1)
2 T+1: (24)
The optimal values for T and T+1 are unique and are provided by solution for the
multipliers below in Section 6. These solutions provide guidance on how the monetary
authority, operating the Taylor-Rule exit policy, should optimally choose policy parame-
ters.
4.2 Solution Prior to Exit the ZLB
The solution prior to exiting the ZLB for yt and t is similar to that under the Taylor-
Rule exit policy because with the nominal interest rate set equal to zero, the dynamic
behavior of the output gap and ination is governed by identical equations. The only
di¤erence is that the relationship between output and ination at T + 1 is governed by
 2 in equations (22) instead of by  in equation (9). Solutions are given by
12The second expression is identical to that in Jung et al (2005).
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yt =
1
 (!2   !1)
"
1
!1
T+1 t
(!2    2) (1  !1) +

1
!2
T+1 t
( 2   !1) (1  !2)
#
T+1
+

 (!2   !1)
"
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t
(1  !1) 

1
!2
k+1 t
(1  !2)
#
rnk ; (25)
t =
1
(!2   !1)
"
1
!1
T+1 t
(!2    2) +

1
!2
T+1 t
( 2   !1)
#
T+1
+

 (!2   !1)
"
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t
 
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t#
rnk : (26)
These equations yield the same insights about how policy can a¤ect the time paths of
the output gap and ination during the ZLB. Postponing exit time (T + 1) beyond the
date on which the natural rate becomes positive adds terms with positive values of the
natural rate, creating stimulus. The term multiplying ination upon exit is positive and
increasing in T . Therefore, the value of ination upon exit (T+1) also provides stimulus.
5 Equivalence between Full Commitment to the Taylor-
Rule Exit Policy and Optimal Policy
Theorem: If the monetary authority chooses its policy parameters, T + 1;
; and 
; optimally, then the Taylor Rule exit policy implements optimal
monetary policy.
Proof: Solutions for the output gap and ination before exit under the Taylor
Rule, equations (12) and (13), are equivalent to those under optimal policy
after exit, equations (25) and (26), if the monetary authority chooses  =  2;
chooses T equal to its optimal value, and chooses  to yield the optimal
ination rate upon exit, T+1: The last choice requires a value of the ination
target given by
 =
 (1   ) (2   )
z
T+1:
Additionally, these choices imply that solutions for values of the output gap
and ination after exit under the Taylor Rule, given by equations (10) and (11)
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are identical to solutions after exit under optimal policy, given by equations
(23) and (24).
Therefore, the monetary authority can implement optimal policy by postponing exit
from the ZLB until the optimal exit time, choosing an ination target in the Taylor Rule
compatible with the optimal value of ination upon exit, and allowing the target to vanish
at a rate given by the value of the stable root with optimal policy after exit ( =  2) :
Since agents are familiar with the Taylor Rule, and the addition of a time-varying
ination target is a small modication, the Taylor-Rule exit policy provides a way to
implement and communicate optimal policy during and following a zero lower bound
event. Full commitment to the Taylor-Rule exit policy is an optimal policy.
Optimal exit time and the optimal ination target are determined by continuing to
solve the optimal monetary policy problem for the multipliers.
6 Optimal Exit Time and Ination Value
6.1 Analytical Solution
For t  T + 2; equation (20), together with equation (23), yields a solution for 2;t
given by
2;t =


yt =
 2
(1   2)
 
t (T+1)
2 T+1:
Therefore, the solution for 2;T+2 is given by
2;T+2 =
 2
(1   2)
 2T+1: (27)
We need solutions for 2;T+1; 2;T ; and 1;T : In period T + 1; the period of exit,
equations (14) and (15) with 1;T+1 = 0 yield
2;T+1   2;T + T+1    11;T = 0; (28)
  11;T + yT+1   2;T+1 = 0: (29)
In period T + 2; these equations imply
2;T+2   2;T+1 + T+2 = 0;
yT+2   2;T+2 = 0:
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Solving these equations, together with equation (22), yields
1;T = 0;
2;T =
1
(1   2)
T+1; (30)
2;T+1 =
 2
(1   2)
T+1 =  22;T :
Solution for optimal values of T+1 and T , requires solutions for the multipliers leading
up to and including the exit period. The equations for the output gap and ination for
periods prior to exit (t  T + 1) can be written in matrix notation as
Zt = AZt 1   arnt ;
where
Zt =
"
yt
t
#
A =
"
1 + 

 

 

1

#
a =
"

0
#
:
A forward solution of the system to time T + 1 yields
Zt =
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk + A
 (T t+1)ZT+1:
From equations (22) and (30),
ZT+1 = WT ;
where
W =
"
0 

 2
0 1   2
#
T =
"
1;T
2;T
#
:
Substituting, we can write the solution for Zt as
Zt =
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk + A
 (T t+1)WT : (31)
Write the equations for the multipliers as
t = Ct 1  DZt; (32)
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where
t =
"
1;t
2;t
#
C =
"
1+




1
#
D =
"
 
0 1
#
:
Solve t forward to time T , imposing that initial values (period 0) of both multipliers are
zero, to yield
T =  
TX
t=1
CT tDZt:
Substituting from equation (31), we have an equation in T , given by
T =  
TX
t=1
CT tD
"
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk + A
 (T t+1)WT
#
:
The solution for T is given by the value of T which solves
T =
"
0
2;T
#
(33)
=  
"
I +
TX
t=1
CT tDA (T t+1)W
# 1 TX
t=1
CT tD
"
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk
#
:
Given T , the solution for T+1 is given by (1   2)2;T :
6.2 Numerical Solution
6.2.1 Benchmark Parameter Values
As a benchmark, we use the RBC parameterization from Adam and Billi (2006),
 = 1;  = 0:99;  = 0:057; ' = 1:5; 'y = 0:5;  = 0:0074:
All ow values are expressed at quarterly rates. The values for the elasticity of substitution
and the discount factor are standard. The value of  is consistent with 34% of rms
adjusting their price each period when demand elasticity is 7.66 and the elasticity of rm
marginal cost is 0.47.
6.2.2 Problems with Integer T
The numerical algorithm considers alternative values for the optimal T by computing
values for 1;T for successive values of T; beginning with T large enough for the nominal
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interest rate to be positive. In this range, 1;T is falling in T; eventually becoming negative
as T continues to increase. Equation (33) requires that 1;T = 0 at the optimum. However,
since T increases discretely, with 1;T falling in T , for a given value for the shock, there
is a value for T for which 1;T > 0 and 1;T+1 < 0: We never actually observe a value of
T for which 1;T = 0 due to the integer constraint on T:
For each value of the shock, consider choosing T as the last date for which 1;T remains
positive (theoretically, it is never negative). The value for the ination target is determined
by the value for 2T : Figure (1) plots values for 1;T and 2;T ; over a range of values for
the initial shock, ; where the value for T is calculated as suggested above.
Figure: 1 Multipliers for Di¤erent Shocks
As the size of the shock increases, there is a range of values for the shock, for which exit
time is xed (not shown in graph) and both multipliers rise. As the size of the shock
continues to increase, there is a critical value for the shock at which exit time rises by
one unit and both multipliers fall discretely. As shock size continues to rise above each
of these critical values, the size of both multipliers rises until the shock reaches another
critical value. Therefore, both multipliers reach local minima at critical values of shock
size for which exit time discretely rises.
Since 1;T > 0; the optimal exit time is actually larger than T: If exit time were
continuous, we would raise exit time just enough to get 1;T = 0: This increase in exit
time would also reduce 2;T : The closer 1;T is to zero, the less we would need to raise
a continuous value for the exit time above our choice of T to get 1;T to reach zero.
Therefore, the optimal exit time, chosen by the above method, approaches the optimum
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without an integer constraint, as the value for 1;T approaches zero. Since we optimally
want to raise T less at critical shock values, the integer constraint is least binding at
these critical values. And the value for 2;T is also closest to its value without an integer
constraint for these critical values of shocks. Comparing the optimal value of ination
upon exit, implied by values of 2;T in Figure (1) for any two discrete values of the shock,
reveals that the ination value could rise or fall as the shock size increases depending on
how binding the integer constraint is for the particular set of shock sizes we have chosen.
The integer constraint is a¤ecting the solution, particularly the value for optimal ination
upon exit.13
We do not believe that the integer constraint actually constrains monetary policy. A
binding integer constraint would mean that there are only four dates in the year on which
the monetary authority could choose to raise the interest rate for the rst time. This
restriction does not appear realistic. Therefore, we want a solution for which the integer
constraint is as close to non-binding as possible. The integer constraint is least binding
at the critical values of shocks for which the multipliers reach local minima. We consider
shock values which increase in increments of 1.0e-9, so that minimum values for 1;T get
very close to zero, and restrict attention to the set of critical shock values (those for which
the multipliers reach local minima).
With these restrictions, multipliers are the lower envelopes of the two seesaw lines in
Figure 1. As shock size rises, 1;T remains very close to zero. In contrast, 2;T is negative
for any shock size and is falling in shock size. This later result implies that optimal
ination upon exit is always negative and that it is decreasing in shock size. Failure to
restrict attention to shock values for which the multipliers reach local minima yields a
positive value for optimal ination upon exit for some shock values. Positive ination
is compensating for the inability to raise exit time by something less than one discrete
unit and therefore for having exit time too small relative to the optimal continuous value.
Additional experimentation has revealed that the negative value for ination upon exit is
robust to persistence of the shock and to changes in other parameter values.14
13Were we to actually impose the integer constraint in the solution for optimal exit time, we would not
get the solution we propose. The monetary authority could explicity use the ination target to compensate
for not raising the exit time su¢ ciently or for raising it too much due to the integer constraint.
14We have reduced persistence to 0.80, considered values of  between 0.16 and 6.25, and considered a
lower value for  equal to 0.24.
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6.2.3 Optimal Exit Strategy
We present the optimal exit strategy in terms of the Taylor-Rule exit policy. All values
for the output gap, ination and the nominal interest rate along the adjustment path are
identical to those for optimal policy. Our purpose in using the Taylor-Rule exit policy to
present the results is to illustrate that communication can occur in terms of the Taylor
Rule, augmented with the time-varying ination target.
Consider the time paths for the output gap and ination with the optimal Taylor-Rule
exit policy after a particularly large adverse shock,  = 0:02253508 in period one, sending
the natural rate to an annual rate of -4.97% . We set persistence high ( = 0:90) such
that the natural rate that does not return to positive territory until period nine. The
monetary authority optimally postpones raising the interest rate until period 14, fully
ve periods after the nominal rate has become positive. Optimal ination in the exit
period is negative and is given by (1   2)2T =  0:0396% at a quarterly rate. This
requires an ination target for the Taylor Rule given by equation (8), as
 =
 (1    2) (2    2)
z
T+1 =  0:0703%;
where the monetary authority has chosen  =  2:
Figure 2 plots the time paths for the output gap, ination, and the nominal interest
rate, beginning with the initial shock. Values on the vertical axis are quarterly percentages
expressed at annual rates, while values on the horizontal axis are quarters. The shock
occurs in quarter 1. As a benchmark, we also plot the time path that a truncated Taylor
Rule, with a zero ination target and an intercept given by the natural rate, would deliver.
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Figure: 2 Alternative Taylor Rules
Before continuing with the presentation of the Taylor-Rule exit policy, consider why
the truncated Taylor Rule is a natural benchmark. The truncated Taylor Rule represents
optimal policy when the monetary authority can commit only to follow a Taylor Rule,
but not to an exit date or an ination target. Essentially, the truncated Taylor Rule
implements optimal discretionary policy.15 Under this policy, the nominal interest rate
is zero as long as the natural rate is negative. Once the natural rate becomes positive,
the monetary authority optimally raises the nominal rate to the natural rate, thereby
returning both the output gap and ination to their optimal values of zero.
Under full commitment to the Taylor-Rule exit policy, the monetary authority promises
15As Cochrane (2011) argues, the Taylor Rule itself requires commitment to "blow up" the economy
in the event of a sunspot shock, thereby assuring a locally unique equilibrium.
18
to postpone the exit date16 and to exit with deation which vanishes over time. The exit
date and the ination-target parameters are all chosen optimally. This policy provides
considerable stimulus upon impact, all stemming from the postponed exit date. The later
exit date implies that there are more periods for which the monetary authority could
have raised the nominal interest rate, but has chosen not to. This raises inationary
expectations, raising output and ination, compared to a truncated Taylor Rule.
In contrast, the negative ination target upon exit reduces inationary expectations
and is contractionary. As the exit date nears, expectations of deation actually cause
a small recession coupled with deation prior to the arrival of the exit date.17 On the
exit date, the monetary authority raises the nominal interest rate higher than the real
rate to exacerbate the recession and deation, which reach troughs at -0.16% and -1.34%
respectively, at annual rates. Both remain small and quickly vanish over the next few
quarters. The deation and recession upon exit point to the importance of the ability to
commit, not only to an exit date, but also to exit with deation and recession.
The negative value of ination upon exit runs counter to the notion that all means
of monetary-policy stimulus should be employed at the ZLB, including postponing exit
time and raising ination upon exit. Walsh (2009), Levine et al (2009), and Cochrane
(2013) all discuss the benets of promising to exit the ZLB with positive ination. Why
does optimal policy require a negative ination target which produces a small future
recession with deation? Loss is determined by discounted squared deviations. The
large adverse shock itself creates large negative deviations, which vanish over time under
a truncated Taylor Rule. With loss determined by discounted squared deviations, it
is optimal to smooth these deviations over time, reducing the initial large and lightly-
discounted deviations at the expense of creating new small and more heavily deviations
in the future. The postponed exit date reduces the magnitude of early negative deviations,
while the negative ination target restrains both the reduction in the size of the initial
negative deviations as well as their reversal to positive, at the expense of creating small
negative deviations in the future. Greater loss reduction is possible with greater reduction
of the initial deviations (which are large) at the expense of creating later deviations (which
are small).
The loss under the truncated Taylor Rule is 4.85 times as great as the loss under the
optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy. In general, relative loss is increasing in both the size of
16The postponed exit date is the feature of optimal monetary policy emphasized by Jung et al (2005).
17Postponing exit beyond the rst date on which the natural rate of interest becomes positive achieves
the overshooting of the ination rate, necessary to reduce the real rate of interest. And, although ination
is negative in the exit period, it is positive on the rst date for which the natural rate becomes positive.
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the shock and in its persistence. With high persistence, 0.90 in this example, and a range
of initial shocks sending the natural rate of interest to values between -0.06 and -4.97 at
annual rates, loss due to failure to commit ranges from about 2.5 to 7 times that under
commitment. When persistence is lower, for example 0.80, the range of excess loss is
smaller, between 2.5 and 3.2 times that under commitment. These results highlight the
relative importance of pursuing the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy when the negative
shock is large and highly persistent.
The need to commit to a future recession and deation could pose a political problem
to commitment, even though the magnitude of the recession and deation are small.18
The forward guidance provided by the Federal Reserve on US monetary policy stresses
that the nominal interest rate will remain zero for a "considerable period," but never
states that once that period ends, that it will rise su¢ ciently to exacerbate or create a
recession and deation. What does the monetary authority lose in welfare if it can commit
to postpone the exit date from the ZLB beyond that using a truncated Taylor Rule, but
cannot commit to the deation target upon exit?
7 Limited Commitment to a Taylor Rule Exit Policy
In this section, we investigate a form of limited commitment by the monetary authority.
We assume that the monetary authority can commit to an exit date from the ZLB,
but it cannot commit to a deation target on that exit date. It chooses the exit date
optimally, conditional upon a zero ination target upon exit. We refer to this policy as
a "T-only" policy, since the monetary authority chooses only the date on which to begin
implementation of the Taylor Rule with the xed ination target of zero.19 This policy
is very much like the "forward guidance" for interest rates which the US Federal Reserve
enacted in 2008, whereby they have promised to keep nominal interest rates near zero for
"a considerable period."
We solve this problem numerically, choosing the value for the exit date (T + 1) which
yields the highest welfare. We solve the optimization problem over a large grid of mag-
18Jeanne and Svensson (2007) are concerned with the ability to commit to positive ination upon
exit. Their solution, relying on the central banks desire to maintain the value of their foreign currency
reserves, does not work when the commitment is to deation. However, over much of the period for
which the natural rate is positive and the nominal rate is zero, optimal ination is positive. The positive
ination after the natural rate becomes positive requires commitment, which could be supported by their
mechanism. The subsequent deation cannot be supported by their mechanism.
19Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2012) analyze a similar policy in the same New Keynesian model
without the initial adverse shock creating the ZLB.
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nitudes for the shocks and observe that as shock size increases, welfare has a downward
trend, but the fall is not monotonic. Specically, when the integer value for T is optimal,
welfare reaches a local maximum, and, as the shock size changes in both directions, T
remains xed and welfare falls. As the shock size changes from a value for which the
optimal value of T is an integer, agents would like to chose a non-integer value for T ,
but cannot, implying lower welfare since the optimal value of T is not actually an integer.
Since we do not believe that the integer constraint is actually binding in the real world, we
would like to consider results where the integer value for T is actually optimal. Therefore,
we follow a strategy similar to that in the solution of full commitment Taylor-Rule exit
policy. We limit attention to shocks for which welfare reaches local maxima. When we
do this, we identify a set of shocks associated with local maxima for welfare. Using only
this set of shocks, welfare is falling in the size of the shock.
We want welfare comparisons under Taylor Rules with full commitment and limited
commitment to choose T only. This is problematical since the admissible shock values in
the two cases di¤er. However, there are two instances in which admissible shock values
are identical up to four decimal points. We compare these two sets of shocks. When the
admissible shock with full commitment is 0.011557 and that with limited commitment
is .0115960, then limited commitment creates loss 20% larger than loss under full com-
mitment. The second admissible pair of shocks is 0.018340, .0183370 with loss 7% larger
under limited commitment. These results imply that postponing the exit date achieves
most of the gains of moving from the truncated Taylor Rule to full commitment to the
optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy.
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Figure: 3 Compare T-Only with Other
Taylor Rules
We reinforce these insights by comparing time paths for the larger pair of shocks in
Figure 3, shocks which send the natural rate to -3.30%. This is a smaller shock than we
considered in the previous section. With limited commitment to the "T-only" policy, exit
occurs one period earlier than with full commitment, in period 10 instead of in period 11.
In the exit period the nominal interest rate is set to equal the natural rate and both the
output gap and ination return to zero. The time path for the output gap, leading up to
the "T-only" exit period is almost identical to that under full commitment, with output
slightly higher early and slightly lower later. Ination is uniformly higher under "T-only"
than under full commitment. "T-only" avoids the deation and recession in the vicinity
of the exit period.
These results seem to justify US Federal Reserve policy following the nancial crisis.
The Fed is likely to face political constraints in committing to future deation and reces-
sion, but not in the timing for initially raising interest rates. We have shown that the
optimal choice of exit time can achieve almost all of the gains of full commitment to the
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optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy.
8 Conclusion
We illustrate that full commitment to a Taylor-Rule exit policy, in which the monetary
authority chooses optimal values for the exit date, the ination target upon exit, and its
rate of decline, implements optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound. Since
addition of an ination target to the Taylor Rule advocated by Woodford is a small
modication, we argue that framing monetary policy at the ZLB in terms of our optimal
Taylor-Rule exit policy provides a way to communicate and implement optimal monetary
policy at the ZLB.
We nd that the optimal ination upon exit is negative. Once we restrict attention to
shock values for which this integer constraint on T is "almost" non-binding, we cannot nd
positive ination upon exit for any standard parameter values, or values for persistence.
And the ination target is falling in the size of the shock. Optimal policy provides
stimulus early, while the negative impact of the adverse shock is greatest, at the expense
of contraction later, as the e¤ect of the adverse shock wanes.
Commitment to the policy parameters required by the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy
could be politically di¢ cult due to the negative ination target upon exit. Therefore, we
consider a policy which requires more limited commitment, a policy whereby the monetary
authority commits to an exit date, but not to a non-zero ination target. We show that
when the exit date is chosen optimally subject to a zero constraint on the ination target,
this policy provides almost all of the welfare gains of moving from a truncated Taylor Rule
to the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy, without the need to promise future deation and
recession. This "T-only" policy appears consistent with the Federal Reserves promise
to keep interest rates near zero for a "considerable period," with no mention of creating
future recession or deation.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Solution under Taylor Rule Policy
9.1.1 Solution from Exit Date Forward
We can write this system of equations given by (5) and (6) in matrix notation as"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
1 + 

y +





   1

 

1

#"
yt
t
#
 
"
t+1
0
#
:
The eigenvalues are given by
 =
1 + 1

+ 

y +





1 + 1

+ 

y +


2
  4

1

  
1 + 
 
y + 
 12
2
;
where y and  are chosen such that both eigenvalues exceed unity. Decomposing the
system into eigenvalues and eigenvectors yields"
yt+1
t+1
#
= E E 1
"
yt
t
#
 
"
t+1
0
#
;
where
E =
"
1 1

1 2

1 1
#
  =
"
1 0
0 2
#
E 1 =

 (2   1)
"
1  1 2

 1 1 1

#
;
with
12 =
1

 
1 + 
 
y + 

:
Pre-multiplying by E 1 yields
E 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
=  E 1
"
yt
t
#
  E 1
"
t+1
0
#
;
where
E 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
E 1
"
t+1
0
#
=

 (2   1)
"
t+1
 t+1
#
:
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Substituting yields "
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
=
"
1 0
0 2
#"
y
0
t

0
t
#
+
"
  t+1
(2 1)
t+1
(2 1)
#
:
Since both roots exceed unity, we solve each equation forward to yield
y
0
t =

 (2   1)
1X
i=1

1
1
i
t+i;

0
t =
 
 (2   1)
1X
i=1

1
2
i
t+i:
We are interested in the value of the variables in the period of exit from the ZLB, that is
in period T + 1:
y
0
T+1 =

 (2   1)
1X
i=1

1
1
i
T+1+i;

0
T+1 =
 
 (2   1)
1X
i=1

1
2
i
T+1+i:
To do the summations, write the expressions for the 0s as
T+2 =

 +
y


T+1  

1 +
y


T+2

=

 +
y

 

1 +
y




 = z;
T+2+i =

 +
y


T+1+i  

1 +
y


T+2+i

=

 +
y

 

1 +
y




i

= zi
:
Substituting, the sums can be expressed as
1X
i=1

1
1
i
T+1+i =
z
1   
;
1X
i=1

1
2
i
T+1+i =
z
2   
:
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This allows us to write the solution for the transformed variables as
y
0
T+1 =

 (2   1)

z
1   

;

0
T+1 =
 
 (2   1)

z
2   

:
To solve for the original variables, multiply by the matrix E;"
yT+1
T+1
#
=
"
1 1

1 2

1 1
#"
y
0
T+1

0
T+1
#
;
yielding
yT+1 =
(1  )
 (1   ) (2   )
z; (34)
T+1 =

 (1   ) (2   )
z: (35)
Note that at T + 1; the output gap is proportional to ination according to
yT+1 =
(1  )

T+1:
These values give us terminal conditions for the solution prior to exit.
Since there is only single stable root, provided by the rate at which the ination target
vanishes, values beyond T + 1 are given by
yt =
(1  )
 (1   ) (2   )
zt (T+1) 
 =
(1  )

t (T+1) T+1; (36)
t =

 (1   ) (2   )
zt (T+1) 
 = t (T+1) T+1: (37)
Substituting from the equations for output and ination after exit, equations (36) and
(37), yields the behavior of the interest rate after exit
it = r
n
t +

1 +
(1  ) (   1)


T+1
t T 1

= rnt +

1 +
(1  ) (   1)

 
z
 (1   ) (2   )

t T 1 :
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9.1.2 Solution Prior to Exit ZLB
Equations (1) and (2) with the nominal interest rate set to zero can be written as,"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
1 + 

 

 

1

#"
yt
t
#
 
"

0
#
rnt :
The roots of the system are given by
! =
1+

+ 1

1 + 1+

2
  4( 1

)
 1
2
2
;
implying that one root is larger than unity and one is smaller. Let !1 > 1; be the unstable
root.
We solve the system subject to the terminal conditions given by equations (34) and
(35). Using eigenvalues and eigenvectors, we can express the system as"
yt+1
t+1
#
= F
F 1
"
yt
t
#
 
"
rnt
0
#
;
where
F =
"
1 !1

1 !2

1 1
#

 =
"
!1 0
0 !2
#
F 1 =

 (!2   !1)
"
1  1 !2

 1 1 !1

#
;
with
!1!2 =
1

:
Pre-multiplying by F 1 yields
F 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
= 
F 1
"
yt
t
#
  F 1
"
rnt
0
#
;
where
F 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
F 1
"
rnt
0
#
=

 (!2   !1)
"
rnt
 rnt
#
:
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Substituting yields "
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
=
"
!1 0
0 !2
#"
y
0
t

0
t
#
+
"
  rnt
(!2 !1)
rnt
(!2 !1)
#
:
Solve each equation forward to period T + 1, yielding
y
0
t =

1
!1
T+1 t
y
0
T+1 +
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k ;

0
t =

1
!2
T+1 t

0
T+1  
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k :
To solve for the original variables, we pre-multiply by the matrix F;"
yt
t
#
=
"
1 !1

1 !2

1 1
#"
y
0
t

0
t
#
;
yielding
yt =
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;
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1
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T+1 t
y
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1
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 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
:
We transform the y
0
T+1 and 
0
T+1 into original variables using the terminal condition
yT+1 =
(1  )

T+1;
and "
y
0
T+1

0
T+1
#
= F 1
"
yT+1
T+1
#
=

 (!2   !1)
"
1  1 !2

 1 1 !1

#"
yT+1
T+1
#
;
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to yield
y
0
T+1 =

!2   
!2   !1

T+1;

0
T+1 =

   !1
!2   !1

T+1:
Substituting into the solutions for yt and t yields
yt =
1  !1

"
1
!1
T+1 t 
!2   
!2   !1

T+1 +
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
(38)
+
1  !2

"
1
!2
T+1 t 
   !1
!2   !1

T+1  
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
;
t =
"
1
!1
T+1 t 
!2   
!2   !1

T+1 +
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
(39)
+
"
1
!2
T+1 t 
   !1
!2   !1

T+1  
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
:
9.2 Optimal Policy
9.2.1 After Exit ZLB
In matrix form, equations (18) and (21) can be written as"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
1 + 
2

  

 

1

#"
yt
t
#
;
with eigenvalues
 =
1 + 
2+


r
1 + 
2+

2
  4

2
;
implying that one stable and one unstable root. Decomposing the system using eigenvalues
and eigenvectors yields "
yt+1
t+1
#
= G	G 1
"
yt
t
#
;
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with
G =
"
1  1

1  2

1 1
#
	 =
"
 1 0
0  2
#
G 1 =

 ( 2    1)
"
1  1  2

 1 1  1

#
;
and
 1 2 =
1

:
Pre-multiply by G 1 to yield
G 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
= 	G 1
"
yt
t
#
"
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
= 	
"
y
0
t

0
t
#
:
These two di¤erential equations in y
0
t and 
0
t can be solved forward to yield
y
0
t =  
t (T+1)
1 y
0
T+1;

0
t =  
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1:
Letting the unstable root be given by  1; the system is explosive unless y
0
T+1 = 0: There-
fore we set y
0
T+1 = 0: Transforming back into original variables yields"
yt
t
#
= G
"
 
t (T+1)
1 y
0
T+1
 
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1
#
=
"
1  1

1  2

1 1
#"
0
 
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1
#
:
The two equations become
yt =
1   2

 
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1; (40)
t =  
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1: (41)
We transform the 
0
T+1 back into original variables using"
y
0
T+1

0
T+1
#
= G 1
"
yT+1
T+1
#
=

 ( 2    1)
"
1  1  2

 1 1  1

#"
yT+1
T+1
#
:
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Therefore,
y
0
T+1 =

 ( 2    1)

yT+1   1   2

T+1

;

0
T+1 =

 ( 2    1)

 yT+1 + 1   1

T+1

:
Setting y
0
T+1 = 0; as previously assumes, assures that the system does not explode. This
yields a relation between exit-period values of output and ination given by
yT+1 =
1   2

T+1:
Substituting yields

0
T+1 =

 ( 2    1)

 

1   2

T+1

+
1   1

T+1

= T+1:
Substituting into equations (40) and (41), the solutions for output and ination for t 
T + 1 become
yt =

1   2


 
t (T+1)
2 T+1 (42)
t =  
t (T+1)
2 T+1 (43)
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